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Abstract
Using U.K. microeconomic data, we analyze the empirical determinants of voluntary an-
nuity market demand. We nd that annuity market participation increases with nancial
wealth, life expectancy and education and decreases with other pension income and a possible
bequest motive for surviving spouses. We then show that these empirically-motivated de-
terminants of annuity market participation have the same, quantitatively important, e¤ects
in a life-cycle model of annuity demand, saving and portfolio choice. Moreover, reasonable
preference parameters predict annuity demand levels comparable to the data, thereby ques-
tioning the conventional wisdom that limited annuity market participation is a puzzle to be
explained.
JEL Classication: E21, H00.
Key Words: Annuities, portfolio choice, bequest motive.
1 Introduction
Why are annuities not voluntarily taken up by a larger number of retirees? In the individual
consumption/savings-portfolio choice literature, a very important participation puzzle arises
from the revealed preference of households not to voluntarily buy annuities at retirement,
despite the strong theoretical reasons that point towards high demand for these products.
Specically, as early as 1965, Yaari demonstrated that risk aversion would be su¢ cient to
induce a household to buy an actuarially fair annuity as protection against life expectancy
risk. Yet, despite this early strong theoretical result, annuity demand remains very low in
the data,1 what is known as the annuity market participation puzzle.
It is important to understand why this puzzle arises from a theoretical perspective2 but
there is also another, equally strong, empirical reason to explain the puzzle. Specically, there
has been a large shift in pension provision from dened benet (DB) to dened contribution
(DC) plans both in the U.S. and in the U.K.. DB plans o¤er not only a xed monthly
payment but also o¤er it for life, therefore providing a natural insurance for life expectancy
risk. On the other hand, DC plans place the decision of how fast to decumulate during
retirement in the hands of the individual.3 As a result, the issue of annuity provision could
become a very important topic for the well-being of households making optimal nancial
plans after retirement, while the number of these households is forecast to increase both
with the proliferation of DC plans and with population ageing. Understanding the reasons
behind the observed low take-up of annuities during retirement can thus o¤er important
insights in the role of policy and the design of state and employer-provided pension systems.
Understanding this puzzle has generated a large number of recent papers that have at-
tempted an explanation. Potential explanations involve the lack of actuarially fair annu-
1More recently, Davido¤, Brown and Diamond (2005) show that complete annuitization is optimal in a
more general setting than Yaari (1965) when markets are complete.
2Davido¤ et. al. (2005) imply that an explanation from the psychology and economics literature might
be needed.
3In the U.K. there is mandatory annuitization at age 75 of three quarters of the accumulated assets in a
DC plan.
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ities,4 ination risk,5 a strong bequest motive,6 habit formation in preferences,7 the presence
of some annuitization through state social security and private DB plans,8 the presence of
uncertain medical expenditures,9 non-actuarially fair annuity provision and minimum an-
nuity size purchase requirements,10 rare events,11 and exibility.12 Overall, however, the
current conventional wisdom, as re-iterated by Davido¤, Brown and Diamond (2005), treats
the limited voluntary annuity market participation as a puzzle that remains to be explained.
Nevertheless, despite this strongly-rooted conventional wisdom, very few studies have
attempted to empirically analyze the determinants of voluntary annuity market participation
at the household level.13 What are the characteristics of households that participate (or not)
in this market? Understanding the factors a¤ecting the participation decision can potentially
help us quantify the magnitude of the puzzle relative to the predictions from di¤erent models
4See, for instance, Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky and Brown (1999) for the U.S. and Finkelstein and
Poterba (2002, 2004) for U.K.. Nevertheless, Mitchell et. al. (1999) argue that annuity pricing is not
su¢ cient to explain the low take-up and argue that the moneys worth of individual annuitiesis actually
quite good, therefore questioning this potential explanation of the puzzle.
5In the presence of substantial ination risk the demand for nominal annuities might be quite low. Nev-
ertheless, this explanation would imply a large demand for real annuities, yet the take-up for real annuities,
where they exist, has also been low. Lopes (2006) also nds that the load factors for real annuities are high,
thereby negating the value from having real annuities.
6The preference for leaving bequests may counteract the insurance benets of annuities (Friedman and
Warshawsky (1990), for example).
7Davido¤, Brown and Diamond (2005).
8Bernheim (1991), Brown et. al. (2001) and Dushi and Webb (2004).
9Sinclair and Smetters (2004), Turra and Mitchell (2004), and Webb (2005).
10See Lopes (2006).
11Lopes and Michaelides (2007) argue that the possibility of a rare eventlike the default of the annuity
provider cannot by itself explain the puzzle since such a rare event would change behavior for high risk
aversion coe¢ cients but a high risk aversion simultaneously makes annuity demand stronger.
12Milevsky and Young (2002) argue that buying an annuity limits household exibility to invest in the
stock market. Ameriks et. al. (2007) nd a signicant aversion to ending up at a nursing home funded by
the state; such medicaid-aversionmay explain why households do not commit to the illiquid expenditure
of buying an annuity.
13Recently, Brown and Poterba (2006) study variable (or equity-linked) annuities and focus on the impact
of the households marginal tax rate. Nevertheless, variable annuities only recently developed to a signicant
part of the total annuity market.
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of economic behavior. In this paper we rst undertake such a task and investigate empirically
the determinants of annuity market participation from the U.K. voluntary annuity market.14
Our empirical work provides an in depth analysis of what determines voluntary annuity
market participation, and what a¤ects the level of annuity demand conditional on partici-
pation. Our empirical results reconrm and uncover certain stylized facts against which any
theoretical model of the annuitization decision should be measured. We reconrm that there
appears to be a substantial voluntary annuity market participation puzzle since less than
6% of households participate in this market. Moreover, our multivariate analysis shows that
annuity market participation increases with life expectancy, education and nancial wealth.
Pension income (or compulsory annuity income) crowds out annuity demand conditional
on voluntary annuity market participation, while a possible bequest motive for surviving
spouses is a hurdle for voluntary annuitization. In all regressions, we nd that the annuiti-
zation behavior of stock market participants is better explained by a reduced form model
than the behavior of stock market non-participants. We view these empirical ndings as
interesting in their own right since they increase our understanding of the determinants of
annuity market participation and can provide a certain set of stylized facts that quantitative
models can (or cannot) match.
In the second part of this paper we actually perform such a quantitative analysis. Speci-
cally, we build a model of life-cycle saving, portfolio choice and annuity market participation
subject to di¤erent (realistic) frictions and investigate whether reasonable assumptions about
preferences and the economic environment can replicate the observed propensities to partici-
pate in the annuity market, and the level of annuities purchased conditional on participation.
Given that the model is non-linear and is solved numerically, we perform a large number
of comparative statics to understand the models predictions in terms of policy functions.
14We focus on U.K. data (the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA, see Marmot et al., 2006)) due
to the the large array of annuity market products available to the consumer in this market. Brown (2001)
has a similar research objective based on the U.S. equivalent of the U.K. data we use, but undertakes a
di¤erent research strategy. Specically, Brown (2001) focuses on rst calculating the value of having access
to an annuity market for each household (based on a life-cycle simulated model) and then relates this value
to observable characteristics. Instead, we try to nd the parameters of a simulated model that may shed light
on annuity demand, after using the data to isolate the characteristics of actual annuity market participants.
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We then use the wealth distributions and median pension levels from the data as exoge-
nous inputs to the model to generate the predicted demand for annuities at retirement for
the di¤erent cases, further helping us understand the implications of the numerically-solved
model.
We next use a method of simulated moments to estimate three preference parameters that
can match as closely as possible three moments in the data: the annuity market participation
rate, and, conditional on participation, the amount of annuities purchased and the share of
wealth annuitized. We choose to perform this analysis separately for stockholders and non-
stockholders both on account of our multivariate probit ndings and due to the large impact
stock market investment opportunities have on the annuity decision in the theoretical model.
Specically, households optimally choose not to buy an annuity if they realize they can have
access to the stock market. The exibility associated with investment in the stock market
rather than locking in the xed annuity payout seems to be an intuitive explanation for a
number of households choosing not to buy an annuity and we therefore perform our structural
estimation separately for the two groups of households (stockholders have access to the stock
market and non-stockholders do not).15
We use our resulting estimates to address how deep is the annuity market participation
puzzle. We nd that the implications of the fully rational life-cycle model are consistent
with the empirical ndings for reasonable preference specications. For both stockholders
and non-stockholders, we need a mild bequest motive, a risk aversion of around 2 and an
elasticity of intertemporal substitution of around 0.6, and we view these parameter esti-
mates as reasonable estimates for preferences, consistent with the empirical evidence in, for
15We do not model the endogenous decision of whether to participate or not in the stock market. Gomes
and Michaelides (2005) argue in a similar life-cycle model that households with low nancial wealth can be
kept out of the stock market with a small xed cost. Given that in our data the households that do not
participate in the stock market are much poorer in terms of nancial wealth than stock market participants,
we think that a small xed cost will keep these households out of the stock market as well. We do not
model this endogenous choice explicitly here to keep the model relatively simple. Nevertheless, we view this
as a short-cut to having an explicit xed cost (capturing anything from a monetary cost to a utility-cost
coming from inertia or inability (through inadequate education) to assess information) that can generate an
endogenous separation between participants and non-participants in the stock market.
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instance, Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002). Overall, comparing
the predictions of the model with their empirical counterparts we nd that reasonable cali-
brations can generate the low annuity demand observed in the data and that, therefore, the
annuity market participation puzzle might not be as deep as previously thought.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the multi-
variate probit (reduced form) results on the actual determinants of annuity market demand
(dened as annuity market participation and the level of annuity demand conditional on
participation). In Section 3 we perform a number of comparative statics exercises from a
calibrated life-cycle model to understand what a quantitative model predicts about the annu-
ity market. In Section 4 we estimate the structural parameters of this model and investigate
the strength of the annuity market participation puzzle by comparing the moments in the
data to the ones from the model. Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical Analysis
2.1 Dataset
The empirical part of the paper is based on the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA,
see Marmot et al., 2006). ELSA is a biannual panel survey among those aged 50 and over
(and their younger partners) living in private households in England in 2002. For most of the
variables of interest we use data from the rst wave of ELSA collected in 2002 and 2003. We
restrict our analysis to households with either a retired single, or a couple with at least one
retired person, since annuitization is likely to occur during retirement and we are interested
in possible substitution e¤ects between public and private pension income and annuities.16
We focus on voluntary annuitization, which is recorded in ELSA as a part of the Income
and Assetsmodule. After collecting information about the amounts of state pensions and
private pensions from personal or employer pension schemes a household received during
16With this restriction, we exclude 2,206 non-retired households. We do not view this restriction as
important for our analysis since we only observe 14 voluntary annuity contracts for these households in the
rst wave of ELSA.
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the year before the interview, the survey proceeds requesting information about the amount
of received annuity income. The questionnaire gives a denition of annuity income, which
should prevent any misinterpretation: Annuity income is when you make a lump sum
payment to a nancial institution and in return they give you a regular income for the rest
of your life.17 Detailed descriptive statistics for the occurrence and magnitude of voluntary
annuitization and for all other variables of interest will be given in the subsequent sections.
The Income and Assetsmodule of ELSA is distributed to all nancial units within a
household. A nancial unit is either a single person, or a couple if the latter declares to share
their income and assets. If a couple treats their income and assets separately it will consist
of two nancial units. Financial units are to be distinguished from benet units, which are
either single persons or couples irrespectively of their agreement with respect to the sharing
of nancial means. Since we would like to use the annuity information on the least aggregated
level, we prepare the data on a nancial unit level and employ individual specic information
(like age, gender, education, and health) of the person who lled in the Income and Assets
module for our empirical analysis. This means that one household consisting of a couple
which separates income and assets would enter our dataset with two observations while a
couple with joint income and assets contributes one observation. Financial information for
the household (like wealth, income) apart from annuities is collected on the household level.
The rst wave of ELSA comprises 12,100 individuals. Our sample consists of 5,233
households. The reduction is explained by excluding households without a member in re-
tirement (2,206 observations), excluding partners from couples who report joint income and
assets (3,536 observations) and excluding observations with missing values for our variables
of interest to be discussed below (1,125 observations).
It is not known when annuity recipients in the 2002/ 2003 wave of ELSA purchased
their annuity. Optimally, we would like to observe household characteristics directly at the
time of the annuity purchase to learn about the determinants of annuitization. We use the
second wave of ELSA collected in 2004/ 200518 to create this optimal scenario. Specically,
observations without annuity income in the rst wave, but with reported annuity income in
17Note that there is no distinction between nominal, real and variable annuities in the data.
18The response rate of rst wave participants was 82% in the second wave.
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the second, must have purchased their annuity in the time between the two surveys, that
is roughly in 2003. By combining the second wave annuity information for these obser-
vations with the rst wave household variables we achieve the desired match between the
annuity and the household background immediately before the voluntary annuitization took
place. Moreover, this procedure increases the number of observed annuities for our empirical
analysis, which is helpful given the overall small fraction of annuity market participants (see
below).
2.2 Descriptive Statistics
2.2.1 Annuities
Table 1 describes the annuity market participation decisions in our dataset, while at the
same time presenting a split of this decision between households that participated or not
in the stock market. We do this based on the idea that stock market participation might
be correlated with the decision to participate in the annuity market since both decisions
require a certain degree of nancial sophistication. According to Table 1, only 5.9% (309
observations) of the households in our sample received income from voluntary annuitization
in either the rst wave of ELSA (207 observations) or the second wave (102 observations).19
Compared to the stock of annuity market participants in wave one, the inow of 102 new
annuities between wave one and wave two appears large in size. This is not too surprising,
however, given the U.K. media attention on pensions during 2003 and 2004. Nevertheless, 309
voluntary annuity contracts among 5,233 households remains a very small number. This is
19In December 2002 the Government appointed the Pensions Commission with the task to review the
adequacy of private retirement savings in the U.K.. In June 2003 the Commission published a working plan
and in October 2004 a rst report (see Pensions Commission, 2004). Throughout this time, the Commission,
the Commissions Chairman and pensions were prominently featured in the U.K. media, which might have
raised public awareness towards retirement savings and potentially resulted in an increase in voluntary
annuitization. A second factor contributing to an increase in voluntary annuity market participation after
2002 could be the default of the Dened Benet pension scheme of Allied Steel and Wire in July 2002,
which again was prominently featured in U.K. media, and might have induced some people to diversify their
pension income portfolio.
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exactly what is generally referred to as the annuity market participation puzzle. Moreover,
the puzzle seems to exist even in the U.K. which is generally accepted to have the most
mature annuity market in the world (see Finkelstein and Poterba, 2002, 2004).20
Table 1 also indicates that there might be an interesting correlation between the decision
to participate in the stock market and the decision to purchase an annuity. Stock market
participation21 is around 42.5% of the total sample but the percentage of stock market
participants purchasing an annuity (9.6%) is three times the percentage of stock market non-
participants (3.2%). The di¤erence is statistically highly signicant with a t-test statistic of
9:1. Equivalently, Table 1 shows that more than two thirds (213 out of 309) of all annuity
market participants also participate in the stock market. Thus, there seems to be some
connection between the decision to participate in the two markets and we will investigate
this further in both the empirical and theoretical analysis that follows.
Table 2 presents annuity demand statistics conditional on participating in the voluntary
annuity market. Specically, the table reports mean and median annual annuity income
statistics and splits the sample across the stock market participation decision as well. Con-
ditional on having an annuity, the mean annual annuity income is about 3; 000 GBP, but this
is dominated by a number of very large annuities as the median of about 1; 000 GBP shows.
Stock market participants tend to demand higher annuities as indicated by a mean (median)
annual annuity income of about 3; 650 (1; 200) GBP. These descriptive statistics give us an
idea about the level of annuity demand that a structural model should be generating to
match the empirical evidence.
The rest of this section will investigate what household characteristics determine volun-
tary annuity market participation and, conditional on participation, what a¤ects the mag-
nitude of voluntary annuity demand. We focus on three groups of variables that might
a¤ect these decisions: wealth and income, health and life expectancy and socio-economic
20Banks and Emmerson (1999) use the family resources survey and report similar statistics for voluntary
annuity market participation.
21We dene a stock market participant as a household that has stocks in an individual savings account
(ISA), or a personal equity plan (PEP), or indirect stock holdings in an investment trust, or direct holdings
of stocks.
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background variables like education, marital status and the number of children.
2.2.2 Wealth and Income
Table 2 reports mean and median statistics for a number of nancial variables that may
be important determinants of voluntary annuity market participation and annuity demand
conditional on participation. We focus on variables that have been shown to be important in
the limited stock market participation literature (see Campbell (2006) for a recent review)
due, in part, to the potential link between participating in the two markets. Specically,
we focus on nancial wealth, the annual amount of total pensions (excluding any voluntary
annuity), and the decomposition of the latter into public and private (personal or employer)
pensions.
To be informative about annuity take-up decisions, nancial wealth should be measured
before annuitization takes place. As explained before, this is readily achieved for the new
annuities observed in the second wave of ELSA where the rst wave contains the appropriate
wealth before the annuity purchase. For annuities already observed in the rst wave we
approximate the cost of annuitization by multiplying the annual annuity income with the
annuity factor and add this to the households nancial wealth. We use an annuity factor of
13.22
Table 2 reports the mean nancial wealth23 of annuitants to be about 135; 000 GBP
and thus around 85; 000 GBP larger than the wealth of non-annuitants. The corresponding
median values are 65; 000 GBP and 14; 200 GBP, respectively. This already suggests that
voluntary annuity market participation mostly occurs among the relatively rich households.
More detailed evidence is displayed in Figure 1. The gure shows average voluntary annuity
22The annuity factor was calculated using the Financial Services Authority comparative tables. These
tables show the monthly payments o¤ered by the main annuity providers under the open market option.
The monthly payments correspond to a purchase price of 100,000 GBP of a single life annuity, with no
guarantee, for a 65-year old male. We use the average monthly payment across providers to calculate the
corresponding annuity factor.
23We do not use housing wealth in our multivariate analysis because we view the relatively higher liquidity
in nancial wealth (with respect to housing) as a more relevant criterion for the household decision to
annuitize or not.
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market participation across the 2.5%, 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 90% and 97.5% percentiles of the
wealth distribution. While average participation is less than 1% among the 262 households
in the bottom 5% of the wealth distribution (2.5% wealth quantile = 100 GBP), it increases
steeply to almost 20% among the 262 households in the top 5% of the wealth distribution
(97.5% wealth quantile = 348,800 GBP). Among the 30% households around median nancial
wealth, slightly more than 4% participate in the voluntary annuity market. Given that the
10% and 25% quantiles of the wealth distribution are 700 GBP and 3; 300 GBP, respectively,
it seems fair to say that households in the lower third of the wealth distribution are generally
constrained by insu¢ cient nancial wealth to participate in the voluntary annuity market.
Figure 1 also decomposes the sample across wealth quantiles into stock market non-
participants and participants. While stock market participants are still slightly outnum-
bered around the median wealth by non-participants, almost all households around the 75%,
90% and 97.5% percentiles of the wealth distribution are stock market participants. The
mean (median) wealth investors who participate in both markets is 174,000 (100,000) GBP
according to Table 2, which is considerably higher than the mean (median) wealth of the
average annuity market participants and places the former among the very rich. In terms of
broad portfolio allocations, the average (median) allocation of nancial wealth to stocks is
38% (32%) for stock market participants and 35% (28%) for participants in both the stock
market and the voluntary annuity market.
Apart from insu¢ cient wealth, one obvious explanation for non-participation in the vol-
untary annuity market is the existence of other sources of pension income. The institutional
details of the U.K. pension system have been described elsewhere (for example, Blundell et
al., 2002, and Blake, 2003) and we only summarize its main features. The main part of the
public pension system in the U.K. is the at Basic State Pension (BSP) which is linked to
the price level.24 In 1978 a second tier of public pensions was introduced in the U.K., the
State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS, which has been replaced with the State
Second Pension (S2P) in April 2002). Employees earning more than the so-called lower
earnings limit (75 GBP per week in 2002) automatically participate in the second tier of
24The pension from this source was around 80 GBP per week at the time of the rst wave of ELSA
interviews in 2002.
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the public pension system.25 Both occupational and personal private sector pensions in the
U.K. are subject to compulsory annuitization laws. At least a part of the lump sum payment
received from these schemes at retirement age has to be used to purchase an annuity within
a certain time from retirement. These compulsory annuities are to be distinguished from the
voluntary annuities purchased from non-pension wealth, which are the topic of this paper.
Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) indicate that the compulsory annuity market in the U.K. is
much larger than the voluntary annuity market: in 1998 the former had a size of 5.4 billion
GBP while the latter equaled 0.8 billion GBP.
Both the earnings-related tier of the public pension system and the compulsory annuity
market embedded in the private pension system might be seen as close substitutes for the
voluntary annuity market under consideration here. For private savings in general, Attanasio
and Rohwedder (2003) indeed nd that the earnings-related tier of the U.K. public pension
system serves as a perfect substitute. Table 2 shows mean and median annual pensions for
the whole sample and di¤erent sub-samples of annuity and stock market participants. While
the level of public pensions hardly changes over sub-samples, there is considerable variation
in private pensions (that is, pensions from occupational or personal pension schemes). An-
nuity market participants receive higher private pensions (mean about 7,250 GBP; median
3,200 GBP) than annuity market non-participants (mean about 4,350 GBP; median 1,350
GBP). The highest average and median private pensions are observed in the sub-sample of
individuals participating both in the voluntary annuity market and the stock market. At
25Originally, SERPS was supposed to pay a pension in the magnitude of 25% of the average of an indi-
viduals best 20 years of earnings. However, when SERPS was introduced, employees already participating
in an occupational DB pension scheme could opt out of SERPS as long as their private pension scheme
provided a pension, which was at least as high as SERPS. Employees who opted out of SERPS paid fewer
National Insurance contributions as a consequence. Blundell et al. (2002) point out that more than half of
all employees and more than two-thirds of all male employees exercised this option when SERPS was intro-
duced. These employees (and those who opted out at a later time) would receive a private pension instead
of SERPS during retirement. The possibility to opt out of the earnings-related tier of the public pension
system has been extended from DB to occupational DC pension schemes and to personal private pension
schemes in later years provided that these schemes fulll certain conditions, which ensure that individuals
are not worse-o¤ if they opt out.
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this stage, it is too early to connect these results with the (non-) existence of a possible
crowding out of voluntary annuities by private pension arrangements. The described pat-
tern of observed high private pensions for voluntary annuity market participants could be
simply attributed to their higher nancial wealth.
Figure 2 decomposes the sources of pension income over di¤erent quantiles of the wealth
distribution. Quite strikingly, the level of public pensions resembles a at pension (of roughly
4,500 GBP per year) despite the earnings-related tier of the system (from 1978 onwards).
There are two explanations for this: rst, the average sample member already was 45 years
old at the time SERPS was introduced in the U.K.. Thus, roughly half of the working life
already has been spent in the absence of an earnings-related tier. Second, many of these
employees already were members of an occupational DB scheme at the time SERPS was
introduced and decided to opt out. Evidence for this is given by Figure 2, which shows that
private sector pensions (the compulsory annuity market) increase steeply over the wealth
distribution. Compared to the level of public and private pensions, voluntary annuities are
small in magnitude. Figure 2 shows that sizable average annuities only exist around the
75%, 90% and 97.5% wealth percentiles.
Summarizing, we nd that both pensions (compulsory annuities) and voluntary annu-
ities increase on average with nancial wealth. We leave it to the subsequent multivariate
regression analysis to determine whether pensions crowd out voluntary annuities for a given
level of wealth.
2.2.3 Health and Life Expectancy
Apart from wealth and existing pensions, an individuals health condition and her life ex-
pectancy (as a shortcut for the whole distribution of the random variable time of death)
should also a¤ect the decision to annuitize since annuities hedge longevity risk. These prod-
ucts are in fact priced to reect the average life expectancy of annuity market participants
and condition on age and gender. If an individual has private information suggesting that
she is unlikely to reach the age of an average annuity market participant, she will not buy
an annuity simply because the product is overpriced for her. Finkelstein and Poterba (2002,
12
2004) indeed nd evidence for adverse selection in the U.K.s annuity market: participants
in the voluntary annuity market tend to live longer than non-participants. More generally,
Rosen and Wu (2004) nd evidence from the Health and Retirement Survey that health
status a¤ects portfolio choice and stock market participation. Since annuities are a form of
nancial product that is even more explicitly linked to health status, we expect that health
can be a strong predictor of participation in the annuity market.
Despite the higher life expectancy of women, they make up only 42% of the sample in
the voluntary annuity market, even though 53% of all sample members is female (Table 3).
Thus, gender as an objective measure of life expectancy does not seem to explain annuity
market participation. Nevertheless, ELSA allows us to analyze subjective probabilities of
survival as an alternative determinant of the annuitization decision.26 The questionnaire
asks individuals of age less or equal than 65 (69, 74, 79, 84 and 89, which is the maximum
age in our sample) What are the chances that you will live to be 75 (80, 85, 90, 95 and 100,
respectively) or more?and gives a range from 0. . . 100 for possible answers. We interpret
answers as probabilities and confront the subjective survival probabilities with gender and
age specic objectiveprobabilities of survival to the respective age limit, which we com-
pute from the life tables published by the Government Actuarys Department (GAD, 2006)
from data between 2002-2004. Table 3 shows that average values for subjective and objective
GAD probabilities are very close to each other and do not di¤er by more than one percentage
point for the whole sample and the two sub-samples of voluntary annuity market (non-) par-
ticipants. This conrms prior evidence by Hurd and McGarry (1995, 2002) for the U.S. that
subjective probabilities tend to aggregate well to population probabilities. However, we nd
that younger survey participants in ELSA underestimate population probabilities,27 while
older survey participants tend to overestimate these probabilities.28 Specically, individuals
26Prior research by Hurd and McGarry (1995, 2002) shows that reported subjective probabilities in the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) aggregate to population probabilities and are correlated with an in-
dividuals observable characteristics like health in the expected way. The authors recommend using these
subjective probabilities in models of inter-temporal decision-making.
27This was already observed by Banks and Blundell (2005) for the same data.
28This is an example of the probability weighting function of Prelec (1998): individuals tend to overweight
low probabilities and to underweight high probabilities.
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aged below the average sample age of 69 tend to underestimate the more the older they
are reaching a maximum of two percentage points in the age group 65-69, while individuals
above the average sample age tend to overestimate with a maximum of two percentage points
in the age group 80-84. This indicates that the timing of the annuitization decision might
a¤ect its outcome.
We see from Table 3 that annuity market participants report a survival probability higher
than non-participants by ve percentage points. The di¤erence in objective GAD survival
probabilities is three percentage points and thus slightly smaller. These results are in line
with the Finkelstein and Poterba (2002, 2004) self-selection ndings for the voluntary annuity
market in the U.K.. Table 3 also shows that annuity market participants slightly overestimate
survival probabilities relative to the GAD probabilities by one percentage point, while non-
participants tend to to underestimate survival probabilities by one percentage point which
conrms the adverse selection hypothesis.
Finally, we try to shed some light on what determines the di¤erence between (self-
reported) subjective and (GAD) objective survival probabilities. The obvious candidate
for any discrepancy between the two probabilities is private information about the individ-
uals health condition. Figure 3 reports average di¤erences in survival probabilities by the
individuals self-reported health condition ranging from bad health to good health.29 Table 3
shows that 62% of the sample members consider their health condition as medium according
to our denition, while 19% either report bad or good health condition. There is a clear shift
from the bad health to the good health category for annuity market participants as Table
3 shows. The pattern in Figure 3 clearly indicates that health condition drives di¤erences
between subjective and objective survival probabilities. Those reporting a medium health
condition estimate the population probability on average without bias, those reporting a
bad health condition underestimate by almost two percentage points and those reporting
a good health condition overestimate by more than one percentage point. This conrms
similar results by Hurd and McGarry (1995, 2002) for the U.S. and gives us condence to
use subjective survival probabilities in the subsequent regression analysis.
29Bad health refers to values 4 and 5 on a 5 points scale decreasing with health condition while good
health corresponds to value 1.
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2.2.4 Socio-Economic Background
The nal group of variables possibly a¤ecting annuity market participation decisions is house-
hold composition and education. Education might matter since annuity products require a
basic level of nancial literacy.30 A household not understanding the purpose and structure
of annuity products will not demand annuities. We di¤erentiate between three education
levels: low, medium and high.31 Table 3 shows that annuity market participants are on
average much better educated than non-participants. While 61% of the non-participants are
in the lowest education group, only one-third of the annuity holders are in the low education
category. For the high education level, the order changes: only 10% of non-participants have
a higher education degree compared to 25% of voluntary annuity market participants.
We study the household composition with bequests in mind, which might be a barrier
for voluntary irreversible annuitization. We view bequests as the intention to leave behind
nancial wealth for the spouse and/or the children. Table 3 does not indicate that marital
status and the number of children vary between the two sub-samples of participants and
non-participants. 57% of participants are married, compared to 56% of non-participants.
The average number of children is two in both cases.
However, the variables in this sub-section (education, marital status, and the number of
children) are correlated with wealth and income. Only the subsequent multivariate econo-
metric analysis may identify the impact of each of the variables on household annuitization
decision by controlling for the remaining variables at the same time.
2.3 Econometric Analysis
We investigate the households decision to participate in the voluntary annuity market and
the demand of annual annuities conditional on participation in a multivariate regression
setup.
30In addition, Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) provide evidence that individuals planning for retirement gen-
erally exhibit a higher degree of nancial literacy than non-planning individuals.
31Low = NVQ1, CSE or equivalent, medium = NVQ2/3, GCE A/O level or higher education without
degree, high = NVQ4/5.
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2.3.1 Annuity Market Participation
Table 4 displays the results of a Maximum Likelihood estimation of a Probit model for the
households decision to participate in the voluntary annuity market or not. The annuity
market participation variable is comprised of existing annuities observed in the rst wave of
ELSA and new annuities observed in the second wave of ELSA. To see if this aggregation
of existing and new annuities is meaningful, we also estimated the Probit model for existing
and new annuities only. Since the results conrmed the ndings of Table 4 we do not report
these regressions here.
The previous section revealed systematic di¤erences (for example, with respect to wealth
and existing pensions) between the two subsamples of stock market participants and non-
participants which are likely to be reected in the annuitization decision. For this reason, we
present separately the estimation results for stock market non-participants (Table 4, Panel
A) from the results for participants (Table 4, Panel B). We use as explanatory variables the
following: wealth, income, household composition, age, health and life expectancy of the
household. In presenting the results, since the estimated coe¢ cient in the probit model only
shows the qualitative impact of an explanatory variable, we also compute marginal e¤ects
to assess the quantitative impact. We do this for a baseline observation that is dened as a
65 years old single male, without children, medium education, an average reported survival
probability, average pension income and nancial wealth.32
Conrming the earlier descriptive statistics in Table 2, nancial wealth33 is shown to
be one of the most important predictors of annuity market participation,34 for both non-
stockholders and stockholders. A 1% increase in nancial wealth signicantly increases the
annuity market participation probabilities of non-stockholders (stockholders) by 2.3 (3.6)
percentage points. On the other hand, pension income (which is the aggregate of public and
private sector pensions depicted in Figure 2) turns out to be statistically insignicant for
32Asymptotic t-values are computed for the marginal e¤ects by means of the delta method.
33Wealth and income information is used in logs. In this way, the marginal e¤ect can be interpreted like
an elasticity.
34For all nancial variables, we tested for possible nonlinearities by including a squared term. This term
always turned out insignicant.
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both stockholders and non-stockholders.
Turning to health and life expectancy, we nd that the health indicators turn out in-
signicant once we control for the subjective survival probabilities. Having seen the close
correlation between these variables in Figure 3, this is not surprising. Correspondingly, we
only include the survival probabilities in the regression, since these are a direct measure of
the longevity risk targeted by annuities. This variable a¤ects di¤erently the annuitization
decision of non-stockholders and stockholders. While statistically and economically insignif-
icant for non-stockholders, the variable turns out to be the quantitatively most important
predictor of the annuitization decision for stockholders. A one percentage point increase in
the survival probability signicantly increases the annuity participation probability by 4:7
percentage points as can be seen from Table 4.
Married nancial units are signicantly less likely to purchase an annuity. The marginal
e¤ects suggest that changing the marital status of the baseline household from single to
married would signicantly decrease the probability to participate in the voluntary annuity
market by almost four percentage points. This turns out to be the quantitatively most
important impact on the annuitization decision for non-stockholders. On the contrary, the
number of children (or the presence of children or grandchildren in alternative unreported
specications) does not have a signicant e¤ect. This could mean that any bequest motive
focuses on the spouse and not on the children. Alternatively, the large impact of marital
status could be interpreted as intra-household hedging of longevity risk, instead of relying
on the annuity market. However, the explanatory nancial wealth and pension income
variables are measured on the household level and already comprise the wealth and income
of the spouse. Therefore, the bequest motive appears to be the more suitable explanation of
the importance of the marital status variable.
With regards to other variables, age enters the regressions with a linear and a square term
and both terms are insignicant for non-stockholders but highly signicant for stockholders.
The coe¢ cients for the latter group imply that annuity market participation increases up
to an age of 73 years and decreases afterwards.35 Women, despite their life expectancy
35For a real option model of delayed annuitization, Milevsky and Young (2002) nd that 73 is the optimal
annuitization age for a 60 years old male who estimates his life expectancy without bias.
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advantage in the population, are signicantly less likely to be voluntary annuity market
participants. Changing the gender of the baseline household frommale to female signicantly
reduces the participation probability by two percentage points for both non-stockholders and
stockholders.
We include dummies for low and high education levels as a measure of nancial literacy.
The low education dummy shows up signicantly negative for both non-stockholders and
stockholders. The high education dummy has the expected positive sign but turns out to
be insignicant. Changing the education level of the baseline household from medium to
low decreases the annuity market participation probability by roughly 2.6 percentage points.
This is a quantitatively large e¤ect and underscores the importance of nancial literacy.
Overall, we nd more statistically signicant predictors of voluntary annuitization for
stockholders than for non-stockholders. This is remarkable since the size of the stockholders
subsample (2,220 households) is much smaller than the size of the non-stockholders subsam-
ple (3,013 households). However, since we observe more stockholders participating in the
voluntary annuity market than non-stockholders, our model does a relatively better job in
explaining the behavior of the former.
2.3.2 Conditional Annuity Demand
We estimate a linear regression model for annuity demand measured in terms of log annual
annuity income on the sub-samples of annuity market participants. Results are again given
in Table 4, Panel A, for non-stockholders and Panel B for stockholders. We estimate by OLS
and report asymptotic t-values using Whites (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator
of the asymptotic standard errors.
All non-nancial background variables appear insignicant in the conditional annuity
demand regressions. These variables a¤ect participation but do not inuence demand con-
ditional on participation. The nancial variables, however, remain signicant predictors of
annuity demand. A 1% increase in nancial wealth increases the voluntary annuity demand
of non-stockholders (stockholders) by 0.33% (0.63%). While pensions do not signicantly
a¤ect the annuity demand of non-stockholders, they have a negatively signicant impact for
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stockholders. A 1% increase in compulsory annuities crowds out the demand for voluntary
annuities by 0.22%.
Again we nd more signicant predictors for stockholders than for non-stockholders. This
is also reected by a larger R2 in the annuity demand regressions for stockholders (22.5%)
compared to non-stockholders (13.6%).
2.4 Summary
We provide an in depth empirical analysis of the voluntary annuity market participation
decision and the annuity demand conditional on participation. We summarize here our
most important empirical ndings against which any theoretical model of the annuitization
(participation and demand) decision should be measured. We reconrm that there appears
to be a substantial voluntary annuity market participation puzzle since less than 6% of
households participate in this market. Moreover, annuity market participation increases
with nancial wealth, life expectancy and education. Pension income (or compulsory annuity
income) crowds out annuity demand conditional on voluntary annuity market participation,
while a possible bequest motive for surviving spouses is a hurdle for voluntary annuitization.
In all regressions, we nd that the annuitization behavior of stock market participants is
better explained by a reduced formmodel than the behavior of stock market non-participants.
3 Understanding the Implications of a Life-cycle Model
In the next two sections we investigate the implications of a life-cycle model of annuity
demand and portfolio choice and assess the models consistency with the empirical ndings
in the previous section.
3.1 The Model
3.1.1 Available Annuity Contracts
We study nominal annuity contracts but for simplicity we assume zero ination. One main
component of the analysis involves calculating the expected present discounted value (EPDV)
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of the annuity, since the insurance company uses this value to calculate the price of the prod-
uct. The EPDV will depend on the annual annuity payment, the survival probabilities and
the term structure of interest rates at the time of retirement. For instance, if at retirement
age the annualized interest rate on a bond with maturity t is rt;1, pt denotes the probability
that the household is alive at date t, conditional on being alive at date t 1 ( p1  1) and the
household purchases an annuity that makes an annual payment of A, the expected present
discounted value (EPDV) of the annuity payouts is given by:
EPDV =
TX
j=1
A
Qj
k=1pk
(1 + rj;1)j
(1)
We use this EPDV to determine the cost of buying an annuity at retirement by multi-
plying the EPDV with one plus a load factor (P ) which is greater than or equal to zero,
obtaining a measure of the moneys worthof the annuity. If the load factor is zero, then
the annuity contract is actuarially fair and the moneys worthequals one.36 Empirical ev-
idence by Mitchell et. al. (1999) illustrates that the load factor varies between 8% and 20%
depending on di¤erent assumptions about discounting and mortality tables; a 20% value is
suggested as indicative of the transaction cost involved and this is the baseline value we use
in our calibration.
3.1.2 Retirement Income
At retirement the household has nancial wealth X1, which can be used to purchase an
annuity. In addition, the household is endowed with pension income in each period, L,
calibrated to be consistent with the available empirical evidence. Letting rt+1;1 denote the
one period interest rate, ert+1 the random return on the stock market and t the share of
wealth in stocks, the evolution of cash-on-hand can be written as:
36The annuity premium/load factor (P ) and the moneys worth are therefore dened as:
Annuity Cost = (1 + P ) EPDV
and
Money0s Worth =
EPDV
AnnuityCost
:
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Xt+1 = (Xt   Ct) exp(tert+1 + (1  t)rt+1;1) + Lt+1 (2)
We assume no borrowing in retirement and no short sales of stocks so that t lies between
zero and one.
3.1.3 Preferences
We model household saving, portfolio and annuity choices from retirement onwards at an
annual frequency. The household lives for a maximum of T (35) periods after retirement. We
allow for uncertainty in the age of death with pt denoting the probability that the household
is alive at date t, conditional on being alive at date t   1 ( p1  1). Household preferences
are then described by the Epstein-Zin (1989) utility function:
Vt =

(1  )C1 1= t + 
 
Et(ptV
1 
t+1 + b(1  pt)X1 t+1 )
 1 1= 
1 
 1
1 1= 
(3)
where  is the time discount factor, b is the strength of the bequest motive,  is the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution (EIS) and  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. The state
variables in each period are current cash on hand, the annuity payment which will optimally
be chosen at retirement, and age. In each period t, t = 1; :::; T , the household chooses
optimal consumption Ct and the share of saving to invest in the stock market subject to a
budget constraint. In the rst period of retirement, the household also chooses the level of
annuity to be purchased.
3.1.4 Wealth Distribution and Pension Income
To eventually compare the predictions of the model with the observed annuity demand and
participation rates, we need (among other exogenous inputs) an initial wealth distribution
and a reasonable pension level, and we take both of these from the data. At the same time,
based on our empirical results, we also condition on stock market participation status and
solve two di¤erent models, one in which stock market participation is allowed and another
where access to the stock market does not exist, therefore requiring di¤erent inputs for
wealth and pension income depending on the stock market participation status. Using these
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exogenous inputs we then compute the average annuity participation rate, average portfolio
demand and the aggregate demand for annuities.
To match the denition of wealth in our model to the one in the data we add household
pension income and nancial wealth (wealth in nancial assets, excluding retirement and
housing wealth) for individuals aged between 55 and 70. Pension income is the median
pension income received by retired individuals and for simplicity we set it to a constant that
di¤ers depending on stock market participation status.37
3.1.5 Mortality Probabilities
Period one is taken to be age 65 and conditional survival probabilities for the typical house-
hold are taken from the U.K. Government Actuarys Department (GAD) for 2002-2004.
3.1.6 Solution Technique and Other Parameters
This problem cannot be solved analytically. Given the nite nature of the problem a solution
exists and can be obtained by backward induction, while we assume decisions are taken at
an annual frequency. We assume a constant interest rate equal to 2%. The mean equity
premium is set at 4% with a standard deviation of 18%. In the baseline case we use a CRRA
preference specication with a coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion equal to 3 ( = 1=3) and
a discount factor equal to 0:98.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Annuity Policy Functions
We now report a series of comparative statics results to understand household choices ac-
cording to this model. Figure 4 plots the annuity demand choice as a function of wealth at
the time of retirement for households that have access to the stock market (stockholders) and
37There is a positive relationship between pension income and nancial wealth in the data but a at pension
here makes the model simpler to solve and serves a conservative approach. Specically, since increasing
private pensions crowds out annuity demand (both in the data and in the model) we create an upward bias
in average annuity demand generated by the model when we use a at pension.
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households that make annuity choices without access to the stock market (non-stockholders).
For both cases, the demand for annuities is zero for low wealth levels reecting mainly the
annuity in the form of pension income received during retirement. Higher wealth levels gen-
erate a monotonically increasing demand for annuities. From the shape of the policy function
it should be immediately noted that the wealth distribution is a necessary input before pro-
nouncing the presence of an annuity market participation puzzle. In an economy where all
households are very poor, the model predicts that no annuity demand will be generated and
therefore the lack of annuity market participation is not a puzzle but rather a prediction of
the model.
Access to the stock market makes the wealth level that warrants entry to the annuity
market surprisingly higher. This is consistent with the idea that households might value
the exibility that can be o¤ered by investing in a higher mean return asset more than the
security of an annuity payout.38 We nd this result quite surprising given the relatively
low equity premium (4%) and the fact that we ignore any stock market predictability that
can make the risk/return trade-o¤ from stock market investments even more advantageous.
We also note that this result is consistent with the idea that stock market participation
might be related to annuity market participation (an idea that received empirical support
in the previous section). Nevertheless, the comparative statics result here could lead us to
conclude that access to the stock market decreases the demand for annuities, contrary to
what we observe in the data. This conclusion is incorrect, however, since simulations must
also be done to compute the total annuity demand given that stockholders are richer and are
therefore more likely than non-stockholders to be very much to the right tail of the wealth
distribution and therefore generate a higher average demand for annuities. We investigate
this issue later on in the paper.39
38Variable annuities, which are linked to a broad stock market index, allow the investor to combine
protection against longevity risk with stock market exposure. Koijen et al. (2006) show that access to
variable annuities during retirement is welfare enhancing.
39Due to space limitations we do not report comparative statics that illustrate how a stronger bequest
motive reduces annuity demand for a given level of cash on hand (when annuity demand is positive). At
the same time a stronger bequest motive also increases the wealth level that triggers entry in the annuity
market. Moreover, a higher risk aversion increases annuity demand, as predicted by the theory. The e¤ects
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3.2.2 Simulated Consumption and Wealth Proles
Given that we have computed policy functions for annuity demands as a function of nancial
wealth and given the initial observed wealth distribution in the data, we can simulate the
evolution of individual consumption, portfolio choice, annuity demand and wealth for the
remainder of a households lifetime.
Figure 5 graphs the consumption prole during retirement for a median-wealth non-
stockholder for two cases (proles for stockholders are qualitatively the same). The rst is the
baseline case. Optimal consumption is decreasing during retirement given the assumptions
about the survival probabilities, the discount factor and the rates of return and consumption
remains constant at the pension plus the annuity payout after a few periods. The wealth
proles (omitted for brevity) reect these consumption choices. Wealth drops at retirement
to purchase the annuity and is gradually decumulated to zero when consumption becomes
equal to the pension plus the annuity payout. In the same gure we also report results
assuming a 0% load factor (actuarially fair annuity pricing). Consumption is higher during
retirement in this case. This reects the higher level of annuities purchased at retirement at
a lower price. Correspondingly, nancial wealth drops by more at retirement.
3.2.3 Portfolio Choice Policy Functions
The share of wealth invested in the stock market as a function of cash on hand and age is
familiar from the literature on life-cycle portfolio choice.40 Specically, pension income is
of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution on annuity demand are non-monotonic and the sign depends on
the strength of the bequest motive. For most parameter congurations, a higher elasticity of intertemporal
substitution (from  = 0:3 to  = 0:8) increases annuity demand since a higher EIS typically leads to
higher saving for this preference conguration and part of that saving is channelled in annuities. In the
presence of a strong bequest motive, on the other hand, the household does not want to increase saving
through the annuity market since higher saving is done not only for intertemporal smoothing reasons but,
more importantly, for leaving bequests. As a result, the (unreported) e¤ects from higher EIS on the annuity
policy functions are reversed in the presence of a strong bequest motive and a higher EIS can generate a
lower demand for annuities.
40For instance, see Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005), Gomes and Michaelides (2005) and
Polkovnichenko (2006).
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treated like an implicit bond since it is certain and therefore the share of wealth in stocks is a
decreasing function of cash on hand since for diversication purposes the investor allocates all
nancial saving to the stock market. For higher levels of nancial wealth to pension income,
the portfolio becomes more diversied with more riskless assets added to the portfolio but
given that there is no background risk (like uncertainty about medical expenditures) in the
model, the portfolio remains heavily invested in the stock market.
An interesting nding is the important role of the bequest motive in generating a more
balanced portfolio between bonds and stocks. As death approaches, a stronger bequest
motive makes the household care more about rate of return uncertainty. The household
derives utility from bequeathing wealth and since there is a probability of death in every
period the stronger bequest motive generates a more balanced portfolio. The e¤ect appears
to be quite important quantitatively and could be an interesting path for future research.
3.2.4 Participation, Annuity Demand and Annuity Value
Given that we have computed policy functions for annuity demands as a function of nancial
wealth at retirement age and given the observed wealth distribution in the data, we can
combine this information to calculate the total level of annuity demand implied by the model,
as well as the percentage of households that will participate in the annuity market. We also
calculate and report the annuity equivalent wealth (AEW) that will make an individual
without access to the annuity market indi¤erent between purchasing the optimal annuity for
the given preference conguration and economic environment or staying outside the market.41
The maximum welfare when annuities are set to zero is calculated by solving the consumers
problem by setting annuities equal to zero, giving a value function equal to V , while the
optimal decision with a potentially positive annuity is given by the value function V . We
then solve for the percentage change in liquid wealth that will equate the two value functions
for a given level of wealth as
V (X(1 +
X
X
) = V (X)
41This calculation follows Brown (2001).
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The AEW is therefore given by 1 + X
X
; a number like 99% means that the household is
willing to give up 1% of its wealth to be able to purchase an annuity, that is, annuities are
welfare improving to individuals. Following the distinction we view as empirically relevant,
we also condition on the stock market participation status when presenting these results.
Table 5; Panel A, reports various annuity demand statistics for non-stockholders for di¤er-
ent perturbations of the preference parameters (risk aversion, the elasticity of intertemporal
subsitution and the bequest motive).42 Annuity market participation (column 4) reports
the percentage of households that participate in the annuity market, while voluntary annu-
ity demand (column 5) reports the average annual annuity income in thousands of pounds
conditional on participation. Column 6 reports the share of wealth being annuitized at
retirement. The last column reports average annuity equivalent wealth, as dened above.
Consistent with the policy function results, a higher risk aversion coe¢ cient increases annu-
ity market participation, the total level of annuity demand43 and the share of wealth being
annuitized at retirement. A stronger bequest motive, on the other hand, decreases all three
measures of annuity demand, while the EIS generally increases annuity demand but the ef-
fect is non-monotonic when the bequest motive is operating. As annuity demand increases,
the value of annuities is reected in a lower AEW. In the absence of a bequest motive, this
can rise to 11% of wealth (for  = 5 and  = 0:8) illustrating the value of annuities for more
risk averse households with a high EIS.
Quantitatively, the results illustrate that in the absence of a bequest motive, annuity
market participation is quite high but there do exist congurations of parameters where the
model still predicts low participation. When  = 2 and  = 0:2, for instance, only 6.15%
of households choose to participate in the annuity market and they annuitize around one
third of their wealth. This result seems very surprising given the existing literature on the
annuity market participation puzzle. What explains this nding? This preference parameter
42We use a range of preference parameters that is deemed reasonable in the literature either through
calibration or through estimation results (see, for example, Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2002)).
43The reported average level of voluntary annuity demand falls but the total annuity demand rises since
there are more participants now. We report this statistic because this will be more directly comparable to
the empirical section which reports per capita annuity income conditional on participation.
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conguration implies a weak motive to save, while the pension system already provides a
substitute for the provision of longevity insurance. As a result, very few households choose to
participate in the annuity market. This explanation is consistent with the other nding from
the table that as risk aversion increases, the insurance value of annuities rises substantially
and annuity market participation can rise up to 67% (for  = 5 and  = 0:5 or  = 0:8).
The table also illustrates that lower annuity demand can also be generated for higher
risk aversion if one is willing to admit some preference for leaving bequests. Specically,
for f = 3,  = 0:3g and b = 1 annuity market participation is around 10% and around
one third of wealth is annuitized at retirement (38%). For this preference conguration, the
average household is expected to leave around 22; 000 GBP as bequests, if it lives until the
end of its possible life.
Similar results arise for the stockholders case (Panel B). Annuity demand and partic-
ipation are both increasing in risk aversion and decreasing in the strength of the bequest
motive, while the e¤ect of EIS is ambiguous/non-monotonic and depends on the presence of
a bequest motive. Even though the policy functions showed that stock market participation
implies that a much higher wealth is needed to participate in the annuity market, the annuity
participation column gives similar results to the ones we obtain for non-stockholders. This is
readily explained by the wealth distribution that is exogenously fed in the model to generate
these numbers: stockholders come from a richer part of the population and therefore the
nal reported participation rates tend to be relatively similar across the two experiments,
even though for stockholders a much higher wealth threshold is needed before participating
in the annuity market. As before, the AEW decreases with higher annuity demand and can
rise to 5% of wealth for  = 5 and  = 0:8; in the absence of a bequest motive.
3.3 Summary
We have used a life-cycle model to understand both qualitatively and quantitatively the im-
portance of preference parameters in a¤ecting the demand for annuities. Preference parame-
ters like risk aversion, the strength of the bequest motive and the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution and the decision to access the stock market are key determinants of the models
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quantitative predictions. Financial wealth is a key endogenous state variable in the model,
is directly a¤ected by these parameters and is therefore a key predictor variable in assessing
the models quantitative implications. Contrary to frictionless theoretical models, the model
does not predict that all households should purchase an annuity since a reasonably calibrated
pension income level provides substantial insurance already. In fact, there exist reasonable
preference parameter congurations that generate very low annuity market participation.
4 How Deep is the Puzzle?
In this section we perform a small empirical exercise to evaluate the extent to which the
models predictions are at odds with the data. We employ a simple method of simulated
moments estimator to pick the structural parameters that minimize the distance between
some selected moments in the data and in the model. The main predictions that we focus on
are the participation in the annuity market, and, conditional on participation, the amount
of annuity demand at retirement and the share of wealth annuitized. Consistent with the
empirical evidence from the previous sections, we separate our analysis between stockholders
and non-stockholders. In both estimated models we have three parameters to match three
moments but we constrain the parameter set to lie in a reasonableparameter space. This
means that we basically restrict the risk aversion coe¢ cient to be less than 10 essentially,
and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution to be less than 2.
4.1 Non-Stockholders
Given the wealth distribution for non-stockholders at retirement as an exogenous input,
Table 6; Panel A, reports the estimated structural parameters from this procedure.44 The
44The parameter vector () is chosen to minimize the quadratic form ArgminD0
 1D. Under regularity
conditions given in Du¢ e and Singleton (1993),
p
T (^   ) ! N(0;WH). The di¤erent components of the
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risk aversion parameter is estimated at around 1:5, the elasticity of intertemporal substi-
tution at around 0:5 and there is some evidence for a bequest motive (parameter equals
0:2). These preference parameters are consistent with parameter estimates from other life-
cycle studies (Gourinchas-Parker (2002)) or studies based on intertemporal Euler equations
(Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)) and they also imply that the model is not far o¤ from a CRRA
specication. The predicted annuity market participation rate for this group of households
is around 4:3% (versus 3:2% in the data). Conditional on participation, the annual annuity
purchased is around 3; 950 GBP (versus 1; 650 GBP in the data) and the share of wealth be-
ing annuitized is around 20:4% (versus 36:6% in the data). There is therefore some distance
between the nal actual moments and the data but given the standard deviations of the
three moments in the data and given our original prior that the model will never generate
anything resembling reality, we view the predicted outcomes as quite good approximations
of reality. It should be noted that non-stockholders holding annuities are a proportionately
much smaller group and therefore more notable deviations from the data for this group are
less important in trying to match total annuity demand in the data, as the next subsection
will show. We think that the intuition for these results is clear. The wealth distribution for
non-stockholders is concentrated very much to the left of the wealth distribution and poor
households optimally choose not to annuitize or annuitize a small fraction of their wealth
since pension income already provides a reasonable insurance against longevity risk.
It could be argued that our results are arising from certain exogenous assumptions in the
model. For instance, we use a load factor of 20% which might be considered very high. We
therefore next investigate the robustness of our results to such maintained assumptions for
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m(Yt) denotes the di¤erent moments chosen, variables Y; ( ~Y ) denote actual (simulated) data, T is the sample
size and TH is the total size of simulated data. Following the rules of thumb in Michaelides and Ng (2000)
we use H = 10. The derivatives are computed numerically and E is the population average (sample analog
used in the estimation).
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which information might not be very accurate. Table 7, Panel A, reports the results from
changing these parameters while maintaining everything else as in the estimated model.
A lower pension (set at the 25th percentile) increases annuity market participation from
4:25% to 4:99%, whereas a higher pension (75th pension percentile) decreases participation
to 3:25%. Nevertheless, the results with regards to the three moments of interest are still
relatively close to their empirical counterparts, if one takes into account the standard devia-
tion of these moments in the data. We next investigate the implications of a lower subjective
survival probability (the household expects the survival probability to be 10% lower than
the objective one). This expectation drives annuity demand to zero and the result is con-
sistent with the multivariate probit analysis in Section 2. We also investigate what happens
when an actuarially fair annuity policy exists. This change increases annuity participation
from 4:25% to 15:25% and voluntary annuity demand from 3,950 GBP to 4,760 GBP. These
results indicate that there is a range of possible outcomes that the model can generate de-
pending on exogenous assumptions, but we view as robust the basic message that there exist
preference parameters that can replicate the observed data as part of a structural, rational
choice model.
4.2 Stockholders
We follow the same estimation procedure for stockholders and report the results in Table 6,
Panel B. The risk aversion coe¢ cient is estimated at around 2:2, the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution is around 0:59 and the bequest parameter equals 0:1. These parameters
are not very di¤erent relative to the ones for non-stockholders and are also an intuitively
reasonable preference specication that is again consistent with the empirical evidence of-
fered in Vissing-Jorgensen (2002). The level of annuity market participation is around 10:4%
(9:6% in the data), with 24% of nancial wealth being annuitized at retirement (26% in the
data), giving an annual annuity income of around 5; 304 GBP (3; 656 GBP in the data).
We view these predicted outcomes as quite close to their observed coutnerparts; in fact,
these predictions are much closer to the data than the ones for non-stockholders. Given that
stockholders are more likely to hold annuities than non-participants in the stock market, the
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structural model implies a good overall t to the data.
There is one caveat to the implications for stockholders. Our model is intentionally simple
and abstracts from any background risks that older households might face (health risk, for
instance). As a result, the portfolio held by the household is heavily invested in the stock
market, since with the provision of reasonable pension income and a certain annuity income,
the natural prediction of the model is that households would hold stocks to have a diversied
portfolio (since annuities and pension income act implicitly like bonds/riskless assets). In our
preferred specications, the share of wealth in stocks is around 95  98% and that typically
decreases to around 50% in the presence of the strong bequest motive. We do think that this
is a potentially counterfactual prediction but we also think that the introduction of further
risks (like health expenditures) in the model (for which liquid balances will be needed) will
work towards both reducing annuity demand and generating a more conservative portfolio,
an interesting avenue for further research.
In Table 7, Panel B, we o¤er some further comparative statics to illustrate that the data
can be replicated by not only perturbing preference parameters. Higher and lower pension
levels a¤ect the participation rate in the expected way and the subjective survival probability
change again reduces annuity market participation. The results therefore illustrate that a
low level of annuity market participation can be a prediction of a reasonably calibrated model
and that they are robust to substantial changes in underlying parameters.
5 Conclusion
We provide an in depth empirical analysis of the characteristics of households that participate
(or not) in the U.K. voluntary annuity market. We document that annuity demand increases
in nancial wealth, education and life expectancy, while it decreases in pension income and
a possible bequest motive for surviving spouses. Moreover, we nd that the annuitization
behavior of stock market participants is better explained by a reduced form model than the
behavior of non-participants. We then estimate a life-cycle model of household portfolio
choice and annuity demand after retirement. The model emphasizes the role of access to
stock market opportunities, bequests and risk aversion (and through these nancial wealth)
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as main determinants of annuity demand. Comparing the predictions of the model with their
empirical counterparts, we nd that reasonable preference parameters can generate the low
annuity demand observed in the data and that, therefore, the annuity market participation
puzzle might not be as deep as previously thought.
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Table 1: Annuity and stock market participation 
 
 
 
  A = 0 A = 1 Total 
S = 0 2917 96 3013 
Row-% 96.8 3.2 100.0 
Total-% 55.7 1.8 57.5 
S = 1 2007 213 2220 
Row-% 90.4 9.6 100.0 
Total-% 38.4 4.1 42.5 
Total 4924 309 5233 
Total-% 94.1 5.9 100.0 
Notes to Table 1: The table presents the number of sample members in sub-samples defined by participation in 
the voluntary annuity market (A) and the stock market (S). “A = 1” (“A = 0”) refers to annuity market (non-) 
participants in 2002 or 2004 while “S = 1” (“S = 0”) refers to stock market (non-) participants in 2002. 
Percentages are either row percentages of the subsamples of non-stockholders and stockholders, respectively, or 
percentages of the total sample size. The sample consists of retired households in the first (2002) wave of the 
English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). 
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Table 2: Financial wealth and annual income by annuity and stock market participation 
 
 All A = 1 A = 0 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Financial wealth 55031 15800 135017 65000 50011 14200 
Annual pension 9328 7305 12182 9036 9149 7228 
Annual public pension 4796 4732 4945 4940 4787 4723 
Annual private pension 4532 1440 7236 3200 4362 1350 
Annual annuity income 179 0 3032 984 - - 
Stock share percentage 16 0 24 14 16 0 
 A = 1 and S = 1 S = 1 S = 0 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Financial wealth 173619 99300 101937 4786 20470 5000 
Annual pension 14142 11660 11523 9132 7711 6315 
Annual public pension 4943 4948 4521 4628 4999 4784 
Annual private pension 9199 6600 7002 4145 2712 500 
Annual annuity income 3656 1200 351 0 53 0 
Stock share percentage 35 28 38 32 - - 
 
Notes to Table 2: The table presents mean and median wealth and income statistics (in GBP) and stock 
allocation percentages for the whole sample (“All”) and sub-samples defined by participation in the voluntary 
annuity market (A) and the stock market (S). “A = 1” (“A = 0”) refers to annuity market (non-) participants in 
2002 or 2004 while “S = 1” (“S = 0”) refers to stock market (non-) participants in 2002. The sample consists of 
5,233 retired households from the first (2002) wave of the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). 
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Table 3: Socio-economic background, health and life-expectancy  
 
  All A = 1 A = 0 
Age / 10 6.93 6.82 6.94 
Female 0.53 0.42 0.54 
Married 0.56 0.57 0.56 
Number of children 2.04 1.98 2.04 
Low education 0.59 0.34 0.61 
Medium education 0.30 0.41 0.30 
High education 0.10 0.25 0.10 
Survival probability 0.52 0.57 0.52 
Objective GAD probability 0.53 0.56 0.53 
Bad health condition 0.19 0.14 0.19 
Medium health condition 0.62 0.60 0.63 
Good health condition 0.19 0.27 0.18 
  
Notes to Table 3: The table presents averages for all sample members (“All”), voluntary annuity market 
participants (“A = 1”) in either 2002 or 2004, and annuity market non-participants (“A = 0”). The sample 
consists of 5,233 retired households from the first (2002) wave of the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing 
(ELSA). 
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Table 4: Estimation results 
 
A. Non-stockholders 
  Voluntary annuity market participation Log annuity demand 
  Probit Marginal effects cond. on participation
Variable estimate t-value estimate t-value estimate t-value 
Intercept -4.0431 -1.50 - - 4.8683 0.59 
Age / 10  0.5708  0.72 -0.0042  -0.35  -0.6805 -0.28 
Age2/ 100 -0.0462 -0.82 - -  0.0527 0.31 
Female -0.1708 -1.77 -0.0214 -1.62 -0.0327 -0.10 
Married -0.3231 -2.98 -0.0361 -2.42 0.1729 0.52 
Number of children 0.0390 1.58 0.0057 1.64 0.1053 0.84 
Low education -0.2254 -2.10 -0.0271 -1.87  0.1988  0.61 
High education 0.2027 1.13 0.0331 1.04 0.1525  0.25 
Survival probability 0.0290 0.18 0.0041 0.18 0.4178 0.63 
Log financial wealth  0.1627  5.10  0.0231  3.56 0.3324  2.17 
Log pension  -0.0783 -1.49 -0.0111 -1.49 -0.0463 -0.46 
Number of observations 3013 96 
Fit of the model Correct predictions: 96.81%  R-square: 13.60% 
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Table 4 (continued): Estimation results 
 
B. Stockholders 
  Voluntary annuity market participation Log annuity demand 
  Probit Marginal effects cond. on participation
Variable estimate t-value estimate t-value estimate t-value 
Intercept -10.279 -4.65 - - -1.2919 -0.23 
Age / 10  1.7066  2.58  0.0280  2.76  0.9186  0.57 
Age2/ 100 -0.1167 -2.40 - - -0.0706 -0.60 
Female -0.1666 -1.98 -0.0218 -1.77 -0.1179 -0.54 
Married -0.3026 -3.10 -0.0359 -2.69 0.0691 0.28 
Number of children 0.0135 0.46 0.0020 0.47 0.0440 0.65 
Low education -0.2065 -2.23 -0.0263 -2.04 -0.0583 -0.22 
High education 0.1587 1.64 0.0262 1.55 -0.1158 -0.56 
Survival probability 0.3205 1.98 0.0473 1.92 0.3446 0.85 
Log financial wealth  0.2439  7.08  0.0360  5.62 0.6303  6.88 
Log pension   0.0292  0.63  0.0043  0.63 -0.2203 -1.99 
Number of observations 2220 213 
Fit of the model Correct predictions: 90.45%  R-square: 22.45% 
 
Notes to Table 4: The table reports estimation results from a Probit model for the annuity market participation 
decision and from a linear regression model for the (log) annuity demand conditional on participation. Panel A 
shows results for non-stockholders, Panel B for stockholders. The Probit participation model is estimated with 
ML using the Berndt et al. (1974) estimator of asymptotic standard errors. The marginal effects are calculated for 
a 65 years old single male without children, medium education, average subjective survival probability, average 
pension and average wealth. The asymptotic distribution of marginal effects is computed with the delta method. 
The linear annuity demand model is estimated with OLS using White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent 
estimator of asymptotic standard errors. The sample consists of retired households in the first (2002) wave of the 
English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). 
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Table 5: Average annuity demand and annuity market participation  
 
A. Non-stockholders  
      Voluntary Voluntary Share  Annuity  
b γ ψ annuity market annuity  of  wealth  equivalent 
      participation demand annuitized wealth 
    0.20 6.15 5.79 34.12 99.75 
 2 0.30 12.80 4.57 37.73 99.53 
  0.50 34.50 2.93 54.16 98.73 
   0.80 66.75 2.10 92.96 91.99 
   0.20 22.10 3.62 44.30 99.11 
0 3 0.30 41.05 2.73 62.30 98.02 
  0.50 66.50 2.10 93.31 94.98 
   0.80 67.10 2.09 92.49 90.21 
   0.20 51.00 2.42 68.98 96.87 
 5 0.30 66.95 2.06 89.18 93.87 
  0.50 67.10 2.09 92.53 91.57 
    0.80 67.30 2.08 92.16 89.36 
    0.20 3.90 3.17 15.59 99.89 
 2 0.30 4.00 3.39 16.73 99.88 
  0.50 3.75 3.21 15.41 99.89 
   0.80 1.05 0.65 2.51 99.90 
   0.20 9.25 5.15 35.35 99.61 
1 3 0.30 10.05 5.19 37.61 99.58 
  0.50 10.05 5.29 38.41 99.58 
   0.80 6.95 5.55 31.94 99.76 
  0.20 25.30 3.47 48.47 98.62 
 5 0.30 29.40 3.23 50.69 98.34 
  0.50 31.75 3.03 47.90 98.26 
    0.80 22.10 3.61 40.41 98.95 
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Table 5 (continued): Average annuity demand and annuity market participation  
 
B. Stockholders 
      Voluntary Voluntary Share  Annuity  
b γ ψ annuity market annuity  of wealth  equivalent 
      participation demand annuitized wealth 
    0.20 5.45 2.79 11.62 99.84 
 2 0.30 7.05 3.14 13.36 99.81 
  0.50 9.85 4.71 21.10 99.67 
   0.80 18.40 5.58 28.50 99.26 
   0.20 17.00 4.45 23.12 99.50 
0 3 0.30 20.60 4.68 25.94 99.36 
  0.50 28.90 4.83 30.33 99.00 
   0.80 40.80 5.12 38.15 98.23 
   0.20 43.25 4.92 39.04 97.81 
 5 0.30 47.95 4.97 42.26 97.37 
  0.50 57.00 4.96 47.81 96.55 
    0.80 69.25 4.96 56.53 95.16 
    0.20 4.30 2.16 8.68 99.87 
 2 0.30 4.70 2.52 10.14 99.86 
  0.50 5.30 3.37 13.54 99.85 
   0.80 6.10 3.98 15.88 99.78 
   0.20 13.20 4.06 19.25 99.66 
1 3 0.30 14.25 4.34 21.00 99.61 
  0.50 15.40 4.82 23.52 99.54 
   0.80 12.30 5.25 23.46 99.57 
   0.20 39.25 4.89 36.57 98.22 
 5 0.30 43.25 4.92 38.65 97.86 
  0.50 49.25 4.86 40.36 97.46 
    0.80 40.80 4.92 35.83 98.17 
 
Notes to Table 5: Panel A reports simulated results for the model without access to the stock market, using the 
wealth distribution from the data as an exogenous input to compute annuity demand statistics, while Panel B 
reports the simulated results using the model that allows access to the stock market and the respective empirical 
wealth distribution of stock market participants (2000 life-histories simulated). The risk free rate is set to 2%, the 
equity premium at 4% and the standard deviation of the risky asset return at 18%. Pre-existing pension income is 
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set at each group's median value. Comparative statics are performed over several preference parameter 
combinations. The bequest parameter is set at b = 0 and 1, relative risk aversion γ is 2, 3, or 5 and the elasticity 
of intertemporal substitution (EIS) ψ is 0.2, 0.3, 0.5, and 0.8. Voluntary annuity market participation reports 
average participation in percentage terms, Voluntary annuity demand is defined as average annual annuity 
income in thousands of pounds, conditional on participation, and the voluntary Share of wealth annuitized is the 
optimal amount of purchased annuity at retirement as a percentage of total financial wealth at retirement. The 
Annuity equivalent wealth reports average AEW, which is defined as the wealth each individual is willing to 
give up in order to be able to access the annuity market. 
 
 
 
Table 6: Estimated structural parameters using the Method of Simulated Moments. 
 
A. Non-stockholders  
        Voluntary Voluntary Share  
Model b γ ψ annuity market annuity  of wealth  
        participation demand annuitized 
Estimates 0.20 1.53 0.47 4.25 3.95 20.37 
s.e. 0.00001 0.0003 0.0003    
Data       3.19 1.65 36.61 
s.d.    17.57 4.57 31.57 
 
B. Stockholders  
        Voluntary Voluntary Share  
Model b γ ψ annuity market annuity  of wealth  
        participation demand annuitized 
Estimates 0.10 2.20 0.59 10.40 5.30 24.00 
s.e. 0.0001 0.002 0.003    
Data       9.59 3.66 26.27 
s.d.    29.45 9.58 25.77 
 
Notes to Table 6: Panel A reports estimated parameters for non-stockholder model using a method of simulated 
moments to pick the structural parameters that minimize the distance between some selected moments in the data 
and in the model. The moments are the participation in the annuity market, and, conditional on participation, the 
amount of annuity demand at retirement and the share of wealth annuitized. Panel B reports the same estimates 
for the model that allows stock market participation. Standard errors are computed using an optimal weighting 
matrix that is based on the inverse of the variance of the empirical moments. 
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Table 7: Annuity market participation, average annuity demand, share of wealth annuitized 
and wealth equivalence measure.  
 
A. Non-stockholders 
  Voluntary Voluntary Share  Annuity  
Model annuity market annuity  of wealth  equivalent 
  participation demand annuitized wealth 
Data 3.19 1.65 36.61 - 
MSM 4.25 3.95 20.37 99.88 
Low Pension 4.99 4.81 26.86 99.85 
High Pension 3.25 3.00 14.36 99.89 
Low Survival 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.0 
Actuarial Fair 15.25 4.76 37.31 99.46 
 
B. Stockholders  
  Voluntary Voluntary Share  Annuity  
Model annuity market annuity of wealth equivalent 
  participation demand annuitized wealth 
Data 9.59 3.66 26.27 - 
MSM 10.40 5.30 24.04 99.89 
Low Pension 18.10 7.55 37.75 99.50 
High Pension 8.25 4.23 18.36 99.98 
Low Survival 2.45 0.16 0.62 99.89 
Actuarial Fair 31.05 18.01 96.58 98.81 
 
Notes to Table 7: Panel A reports simulated results using the non-stockholder model, and Panel B the simulated 
results using stock market participants. The risk free rate is set to 2%, the equity premium at 4% and the standard 
deviation of risky asset return at 18%. Pre-existing pension income is set at each group's median value. 
Comparative statics are performed over several parameter specifications. In particular, for the MSM parameters 
are set equal to estimated parameters reported in Table 6, in Low and High Pension cases the corresponding 25th 
and 75th percentiles of pre-existing pension are used for each group. Low survival is the case where individual's 
survival probabilities are reduced by 10% and Actuarial Fair is the case for annuities with zero load factor. 
Voluntary annuity market participation reports average participation in percentage terms, Voluntary annuity 
demand is defined as average annual annuity income in thousands of pounds, conditional on participation, and 
the voluntary share of wealth annuitized is the optimal amount of purchased annuity at retirement as a percentage 
of total financial wealth at retirement. The Annuity equivalent wealth reports average AEW, which is defined as 
the wealth each individual is willing to give up in order to e able to access the annuity market. 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Wealth distribution, annuity market participation and annual pension income over 
the wealth distribution 
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Notes to Figure 1: The columns show the number of households (measured on the ordinate on the left hand side) 
around the 2.5%, 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 90% and 97.5% percentiles of the wealth distribution in the whole 
sample (“All”) and the sub-sample consisting of stock market participants (“S = 1”). The figure shows on the 
ordinate on the right hand side the average percentage of households participating in the voluntary annuity 
market (“A = 1”) among the households located around a certain quantile of the wealth distribution. The sample 
consists of 5,233 retired households from the first (2002) wave of the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing 
(ELSA). 
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Figure 2: Decomposition of annual pension income into public and private sector pension 
income and annual annuity income over the wealth distribution 
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Notes to Figure 2: The figure decomposes the average total annual pension income of households around a 
certain quantile of the wealth distribution into income from public pensions, private (individual or occupational) 
pensions (excluding voluntary annuities) and voluntary annuitization. The wealth distribution is generated to 
represent from the left to the right 5%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 20%, 10%, 5% of the observations. Correspondingly, 
the abscissa shows the 2.5%, 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 90% and 97.5% percentiles of the wealth distribution. The 
sample consists of 5,233 retired households from the first (2002) wave of the English Longitudinal Study of 
Ageing (ELSA). 
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Figure 3: Percentage point deviations between subjective and gender-specific objective 
survival probability by subjective health condition 
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Notes to Figure 3: The figure shows the average percentage point deviation between the self-reported subjective 
probability to survive up to a certain (age-specific) age and the gender-specific “objective” survival probability 
for the sub-samples of households in bad, medium or good health condition. The objective survival probability is 
calculated from the “Interim Life Tables” produced by the Government Actuary’s Department (GAD) using data 
for the years 2002-2004. The sample consists of 5,233 retired households from the first (2002) wave of the 
English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). 
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Figure 4: Annuity demand as a function of wealth at retirement 
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Notes to Figure 4: This figure shows the policy function for annuity demand as a function of wealth at retirement 
for stock market participants (Stockholders) and non-participants (Non-stockholders). 
 
 
Figure 5: Average consumption profiles 
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Notes to Figure 5: Actuarially Fair represents consumption for the model with access to actuarially fair annuities. 
Load factor represents consumption for the model with annuities subject to a load factor of 20%. 
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